This paper evaluates the relative importance of a "culture of cooperation," which is the strength of norms of trust and respect for others, and "inclusive political institutions," which enable voters to check the power delegated to their representatives. I divide Europe into 120km × 120km grids and exploit exogenous variation in both institutions driven by Medieval history. In particular, I document strong first stage relationships between present-day culture and the forces that aggravated consumption risk-i.e., climate volatility-between 1000 and 1600 and between the inclusiveness of present-day regional political institutions and the factors that shaped the returns from elite-citizenry investments in the Middle Ages, i.e., terrain ruggedness and direct access to the coast. Using this instrumental variables approach, I show that only culture has a first order effect on development, even after controlling for country fixed effects and present-day human capital, financial development, sectoral specialization, climate volatility, and distance to the coast. Crucially, the excluded instruments have no direct impact on development and the economic effect of culture holds within pairs of adjacent grids with different Medieval climate volatility. An explanation for these results is that culture but not democracy is necessary to produce public-spirited politicians and push voters to punish political malfeasance. Micro-evidence supports this idea.
Introduction
Overwhelming evidence suggests that a "culture of cooperation," which is the strength of norms of trust and respect for others (Tabellini, 2010) , and "inclusive political institutions," which enable voters to check their representatives (Persson and Tabellini, 2009 ), foster economic development and are correlated with past inclusive political institutions (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2013) . Yet, documenting that the two types of institutions reinforce one another and are persistent does not help in identifying their relative importance. This paper tackles this issue by devising an instrumental variables approach that exploits exogenous variation in institutions created at the European regional level by Medieval history.
The anarchy created by the fall of the Western Roman empire pushed the population to seek the protection of strong patrons who, empowered by the feudal contract, pacified their estates (Stearns, 2001 ). This new order fueled an institutional revolution that changed Europe forever. On the one hand, attracted by the prospect of farming investments and longdistance trade partnerships, the lords started to offer high powered contracts to the peasants and both protection against pirates and tax breaks to the merchants (Vitolo, 2000) . These innovations flourished where reforms towards a more inclusive political process fortified their credibility (Stearns, 2001 ), e.g., first in the communes of Northern Italy (1050-1628), the maritime republics of Genoa and Venice (1095-1297) , the Giudicati in Sardinia (1100-1297), and the towns of Aragon and Catalonia (1150-1213) , and then with the opening of the Atlantic routes in the Provinces (1384 Provinces ( -1795 and England (1215 England ( -1707 . On the other hand, the monasticism movement, revived by the creation of the Cistercian and Franciscan orders in 1098 and 1209 respectively, started to meet the population's demand for insurance against consumption shocks in exchange for the acceptance of a culture of cooperation. Together with the population, the Cistercians reclaimed undeveloped lands, organized trade fairs, and introduced major technological innovations (Woods, 2005) . The risk of being deprived of such support let the population accept an ideal of charity pursued not through alms but "via moral consideration and practical engagement" [Muzzarelli 2001, p. 115] . This approach was so attractive that hundreds of communities pushed the nearest monasteries to join the order and then embraced the same culture of cooperation [Berman 2000, p. 95, 107, and 223] .
Similarly, the Franciscans organized a network of thousands of houses launching the first micro-credit institutions, i.e., Monti di Pietà (Muzzarelli, 2001) . Once summoned by a community, they first gathered sufficient alms to start and run these pawnshops and then improved "the morality [. . . ] of the customers evaluating the loan use [in order to] make the citizenry cohabitation more cooperative and fair" [Muzzarelli 2001, p. 7 and 216] .
Inspired by these key institutional discontinuities and previous research on endogenous institutions, 1 Boranbay and Guerriero (2013) employ a panel of 90 European regions spanning the 1000-1600 period to test the idea that the elite implements more inclusive political institutions to convince the citizens that their returns from hard-to-observe investments will not be expropriated, whereas the citizenry accumulates a culture of cooperation to successfully share consumption risk and commit to cooperate in investment with the elite. Consistent with these predictions, reforms towards tighter constraints on the elite's power were mostly driven by the factors affecting the observability of farming investments and long-distance trades, i.e., respectively the ruggedness of the terrain and the direct access to the coast.
In addition, the discounted number of years Cistercian and Franciscan houses were active per square kilometres was positively related to the risk of harvest destruction, as driven by the contemporaneous volatility of the growing season temperature, and to the factors depressing the elite's prospect of profitable investments, i.e., the shift of long-distance trades towards the Atlantic. Given that present-day institutional arrangements can be traced back to this Medieval revolution (Boranbay and Guerriero, 2013) , the positive correlation between past institutions created by the commitment dimension produces first stage relationships between past political infrastructures and present-day culture and democracy, which however are insufficient to identify the relative importance of each of the two institutions.
To deal with this issue, I exploit the geographic determinants of past institutions to devise a multiple instrumental variables approach as illustrated in figure 1. The success of this identification strategy depends on the power of the two sets of instruments isolating the roles of culture and inclusive political institutions. Operationally, I divide Europe into 120km × 120km grids and show that the average volatility of the growing season temperature between 1000 and 1600 has a strong effect on the norms of respect and trust self-reported to the 2008 European Value Survey (GESIS, 2008) and no impact on the inclusiveness of regional political institutions averaged between 1950 and 2010. This last variable is obtained supplementing the Polity IV's constraint on the executive score measured at the national level with information on the extent of political autonomy from the central government of the NUTS 2 regions in the sample. The latter has been recognized by a large literature as a key determinant of the citizenry's ability to monitor politicians (Frey, 2005) . The terrain ruggedness and the direct access to the coast have instead a large impact on current political institutions and a little one on present-day culture. Building on these separate first stages, I show that only culture has a first order effect on the log of GDP per capita averaged between 2002 and 2009, even after controlling for country fixed effects and present-day human capital, financial development, sectoral specialization, religious beliefs, climate volatility, and distance to the coast (see figure 1) . Crucially, I cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions at a level nowhere lower than 15%. This last piece of evidence is consistent with the semireduced forms estimates, which suggest that none of the excluded instruments has a direct impact on development once present-day climate volatility is included in the specification.
Finally, the positive effect of culture on economic success also holds within neighboring grids falling in the same country and differing in their Medieval climate volatility.
An explanation for these results is that more inclusive political institutions facilitate the monitoring of politicians by voters but are irrelevant if citizens are not morally compelled to punish political malfeasance or if politicians have weak civic virtues (Boix and Posner, 1998) .
To confirm this idea, I show that criminal prosecutions of Italian Parliament members are considerably smaller in electoral districts in which culture is stronger but not significantly different in those endowed with more inclusive political institutions. This pattern points to a key channel through which culture shapes the economy and cannot be driven only by a more diligent enforcement since prosecutions can be initiated by any Italian tribunal and are consistently correlated with measures of corruption (Chang, Golden, and Hill, 2010) .
The papers most closely related to mine are and Tabellini (2010). The latter also tries to overcome problems inherent to cross-country regressions by using past political institutions to measure the impact of current culture on the develop-ment of 69 European regions. Differently from this and the related contributions examining the within-country impact of past institutions (Dell, 2010; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Gennaioli et al., 2013) , I devise an empirical strategy explicitly accounting for the existence of within-country confounding factors that might drive at the same time past institutions, present-day institutions, and present-day outcomes. instead share with me the aim of unbundling institutions but focus on contracting and property rights institutions. No previous study however has attempted to estimate the separate roles of culture and democracy. 2 Crucially, I do so by identifying the geographic determinants of permanent institutions in a sample in which it is unlikely that geography has shaped the economy otherwise, i.e., by modulating the spread of slavery (Nunn and Puga, 2012) or the colonizers' settlement strategy (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001 ). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and the empirical strategy. Next, section 3 evaluates the relative importance of culture and the inclusiveness of political institutions showing the primacy of the former. Section 4 provides additional evidence documenting that only culture significantly shapes the extent of political accountability. Finally, section 5 concludes. The appendix gathers tables and figures.
Data and Empirical Strategy
The sample consists of 578 grids in 16 European countries for which I have sufficient historical data (see footnote 14 and table 1). The grids have width of 1 • -i.e., 120km, which is the spatial resolution of the most refined geographic dataset I use, i.e., G-Econ dataset. 3 In contrast to a region-based approach, this empirical design allows me to compare observations of similar size and sidestep the possible endogeneity of regional boundaries. The estimates are similar if I discard grids with a land area lower than 100 or 200 square kilometres.
Measuring a Culture of Cooperation
The proxy for culture is obtained from the 2008 European Value Study (GESIS, 2008) .
The most detailed level at which these data can be aggregated is that of the NUTS 2 regions in which the respondents resided at the time of the survey. Eurostat defines NUTS 2 regions on the basis of administrative criteria and their population ranges from 800,000 to 3 million.
The average number of respondents per region is 313 and the median 167.
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Drawing on a large sociological literature (see for a review Tabellini, [2010] ), I define a culture of cooperation as the extent of the citizenry's "generalized" trust and respect for others, both meant as abstract rules of conduct applied also to individuals outside the family (Platteau, 2000) . Starting from generalized trust, not only it favors cooperation in prisoner's dilemma type of situations as documented by a broad experimental evidence, but it also reduces transaction costs, expands anonymous market exchange, and facilitates both the provision of public goods and the division of labor (Dixit, 2004) . To measure generalized trust, I consider the share of answers "most people can be trusted" to the question "generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"-Trust. Turning to respect, it makes individuals more reluctant to free-ride on others and more willing to participate in the political and administrative life of their local communities (Tabellini, 2010) . Operationally, I use the share of answers mentioning "tolerance and respect for other people" as an important quality that children should be encouraged to learn, i.e., Respect. To isolate the common source of variation of the two self-reported norms of conduct, I focus on the first principal component extracted from Trust and Respect, i.e., Culture (see table 2 for the exact definition and sources of all the variables I employ). 5 As detailed in the internet appendix, the evidence is substantially similar when I use either Trust or Respect alone. If a grid belongs to multiple NUTS 2 regions, I assign this grid a figure equal to the average of the values Culture assumes in each represented region weighted by the region's relative contribution to the grid's land area. I apply this procedure to the remaining variables measured at the regional level.
The top right map in figure 2 illustrates the large variation in Culture across Europe and the relative size of both the grids I use as cross-section identifiers in the empirical analysis 4 I focus on this wave in order to maintain a temporal homogeneity with the other data I introduce below. Yet, because of the strong path-dependence of the recorded answers, the empirical exercise will offer similar conclusions should I also take into account the previous three waves, i.e., 1981 i.e., , 1990 i.e., , 1999 i.e., . 5 Tabellini (2010 also considers the cultural relevance of individualism and the belief that effort will pay off.
Yet, these dimensions are not closely related to a "culture of cooperation." Similarly, Culture is not meant to capture social capital, i.e., "those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities" (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2013 Italy, England, and Scotland exhibit a stronger culture of cooperation, the populations of Southern Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia report a more limited one.
As clarified by the comparison between this pattern and that described by the top left map of figure 2 , the distribution of Culture is deeply rooted in the Medieval risk-copingdriven culture of cooperation proxied by Culture-M. This is the discounted number of years Cistercian and Franciscan houses were active in the grid over the 1000-1600 period. 7 The raw data are collected from Van Der Meer (1965) and Moorman (1983) . As discussed above, both monastic orders assumed a key role in the accumulation of culture by organizing risk-sharing activities together with the population, proposing norms of trust and respect, monitoring their effective spread, and punishing the defectors by withdrawing their support. Given the substantial homogeneity of the two orders' action (Tobin, 1995) and that no other order covered a similar role (Logan, 2002) , Boranbay and Guerriero (2013) propose that Culture-M gauges the input to the technology that transformed the citizenry's involvement with culture into evolutionary stable norms of cooperation. This is consistent with the key insights of evolutionary psychology (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992) and Malthusian growth theories (Clark and Hamilton, 2006) : group-specific cultural values result from a process that instills, via natural selection or cross-punishment, norms maximizing the fitness of the group's members. Hence, higher values of Culture-M should detect a stronger past culture.
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Since information on past grid's population is unavailable, I don't normalize Culture-M. Also, I consider only the 1000-1600 period since the Protestant Reformation deprived 6 The goodness of variance fit method minimizes the average deviation of the interval's values from its mean, while maximizing the average deviation of the interval's values from the means of the other intervals. 7 For each of the 712 (2952) Cistercian (Franciscan) houses, this figure equals in year t the difference between the years of operation of the house and those elapsed by its eventual closure if positive and zero otherwise. 8 To further cross-validate this variable, Boranbay and Guerriero (2013) report its high correlation-0.8-with the discounted number of years the Monti di Pietà were active per square kilometres. Since these pawnshops survived only if loans were repaid (Muzzarelli, 2001) , their endurance is related to the share of successful risk-sharing interactions and so it is an outcome-based measure of past culture just as the electoral turnout and blood donations are of present-day culture (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2013) . monasticism of its pivotal role (Stearns, 2001) . A glance to the two top maps of figure   2 reveals that the expansion of the Cistercians in the Benelux, England, Scotland, and Southern France first (Berman, 2000) and the success of the Franciscans in Northern Italy then (Moorman, 1983 ) are associated to a more robust culture of cooperation nowadays.
Measuring the Inclusiveness of Political Institutions
I define the inclusiveness of political institutions as the strength of the rules enabling voters to select more public-spirited representatives and check more closely their decisions.
To capture both aspects for present-day Europe, I supplement the Polity IV's constraint on the executive score measured at the national level with information on the extent of political autonomy from the central government of the NUTS 2 regions in the sample. The Polity IV's constraint on the executive score ranges between 1 and 7 and higher values indicate stronger institutionalized constraints on the decision making power of chief executives (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011) . 10 I consider a region as fiscally decentralized if it can raise a significant part of its fiscal revenues by selecting region-specific taxes whereas the central government maintains its financial responsibility. Furthermore, I treat a region as politically autonomous if it is endowed with fiscal decentralization, can elect its own parliament, and controls all policies except those of national relevance like defense. 11 The message of the empirical exercise will be similar should I switch to either the executive or the legislative index of electoral competitiveness developed by the World Bank database of political institutions. invest the region's tax revenues to produce local public goods. As a result of these patterns, Democracy ranges from a minimum of 3.20 scored by the ex-Eastern Germany regions of Brandeburg and Sachsen to the maximum of 9 observed, for instance, in Vlaams Gewest.
The bottom left map of figure 2 clearly shows that the present-day heterogeneity in regional political institutions has its roots in Medieval history. This map depicts the average over the 11th-16th centuries of the "constraint on executive" variable coded by Boranbay and Guerriero (2013) for each half a century between 1000 and 1600, Democracy-M. The variable is obtained by first matching groups of present-day NUTS 2 regions to the major polities prevailing over the Medieval period (see table 1 ) and then looking at the history of each polity in a 40-year window around each date (see also Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, [2005] ).
Between 1100 and 1350, the first reforms towards a more inclusive political process were implemented by the agrarian communities of the kingdom of Aragon and the commercial republics of the Sardinian "Giudicati", the communes of Northern Italy, and the maritime cities of Genoa and Venice (Stearns 2001). Initially organized as "a sworn association of free men endowed with political and economic independence" [Stearns 2001, p. 216] , such polities were governed by a public assembly that attended to general interest matters and selected the executive. Later on, the shift of long-distance trades towards the Atlantic harbours of Cape Town and Havana allowed the merchants of the Provinces and the Reign of England to constrain the power of their monarchs (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005) . In the postwar period, Medieval parliaments have been restored with the justification that the very specific preferences of a historically homogeneous community should be satisfied by local representatives (Frey, 2005) . The two bottom maps of figure 2 document the long term journey towards more inclusive political institutions of these European regions.
Unbundling Institutions
The options open to a society characterized by a weak culture of cooperation but more inclusive political institutions are very different from those left to a society in which the political process is less democratic but cooperation is facilitated by solid norms of trust and respect. While the former can barely sustain decentralized markets and support both investments and division of labor, the latter has always the option of side-stepping centralized powers and relying on informal networks of cooperation enforcing contracts and protecting property rights (Dixit, 2004; Greif, 2006) . Moreover, culture shapes the way citizens participate in policy making and the behaviors of public officials. On the one hand indeed, a culture of cooperation reduces the citizens' cost of punishing political malfeasance by relaxing the collective action constraint, building their qualities of judgement, and shifting their preferences towards community-oriented policies (Boix and Posner, 1998) . On the other hand, untrustworthy and inconsiderate public officials are likely to engage in nepotism and corruption even in the face of "de jure democratic institutions" (Putnam, 1993) . The very unequal performances of the public administration and the judiciary in Northern and Southern Italy despite the common 150-years-long political trajectory constitute a glaring example.
Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that the performance of a region characterized by a forceful culture of cooperation but significantly less inclusive political institutions-e.g.,
Emilia Romagna-will be superior to that of a region in which a more democratic political process is left in the hands of less respectful voters, e.g., Sardinia. Next, I test this prediction.
Identification Strategy
Ignoring nonlinearities, I can write the relationship I am interested in identifying as
where Y i,c is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in grid i of country c, in euro, averaged between 2002 and 2009, i.e., Income. The data source is Eurostat, which collects the data at the NUTS 2 regional level. I obtain similar results when I switch to the G-Econ's estimate of the GDP per capita in 1985, which is in grid format at 1 degree spatial resolution (see the internet appendix). 12 α c accounts for differences in the origins of national legal systems, the incidence of past wars, as well as other country-wide time-independent factors. C i,c and D i,c
denote Culture and Democracy respectively, whereas X i,c is a vector of controls introduced below. Since the correlation between C i,c and D i,c is 0.28, multicollinearity is not an issue.
The simplest strategy is to estimate equation (1) using OLS regression. There are two distinct issues with this strategy. First, both culture and democracy are endogenous, so I may be capturing reverse causality, or the effect of some omitted characteristics like religion or other geographic features. Second, both variables are measured with error, so there may be a downward attenuation bias. To appreciate the importance of these concerns and cope with them, I compare the inconsistent OLS estimates with those obtained by using twostage least squares-2SLS from here on-with distinct and plausible instruments for culture and democracy. These instruments should be correlated with the endogenous regressors but orthogonal to any other omitted variable, i.e., uncorrelated with the outcome of interest through any channel other than their effect via the endogenous regressors. A successful instrumental variables strategy would correct not only for the reverse causality and omitted variable biases, but also for differential measurement errors in the two endogenous variables as long as the measurement errors have the classical form and β 0 and γ 0 can be consistently estimated (see ). The specifications of the two first stages are
where T i,c is the volatility of the average temperature during the growing season averaged between 1000 and 1600, and corresponds to the instrument for culture (see section 2.5). R i,c
and I i,c label the terrain ruggedness and a dummy for direct access to the coast, respectively, and represent instead the instruments for inclusive political institutions (see section 2.5). The exclusion restriction is that in the population
Cov( i,c , I i,c ) = 0, where i,c is the error term in equation (1).
The Geographic Determinants of Institutions
Building on the institutional traits discussed above and the fact that Medieval economies were primary based on farming and long-distance trade, Boranbay and Guerriero (2013) study accumulation of culture and democratization in a simple and yet general society.
Formally, "citizens" and "elite" members either share risk with any other individual or invest with a member of a different group. The inherent differences between the two activities allow to distinguish between a more fundamental form of cooperation aimed at hedging against consumption shocks and one directed toward surplus formation, e.g., long-distance trades.
First, each group costly instills into its members a psychological gain from cooperating, for instance, by attracting a monastic order. This implicit reward substantiates a culture of cooperation. Second, the elite decides whether to introduce democracy or preserve autocracy.
Democracy allows the citizens to fix the share of investment surplus spent on the production of a public good and its type, whereas autocracy gives this right to the elite. Third, agents are randomly matched and the elite selects the activity if she meets a citizen. The investment surplus and the risk-sharing payoff are each shaped by a specific exogenous factor, e.g., geography. In addition, heterogeneity in the production abilities and the preferences for the public goods renders investment infeasible under autocracy. The equilibrium prescribes that a rise in the investment surplus favors democratization, whereas accumulation of culture increases with the forces aggravating consumption risk if they are not too strong.
Consistent with this prediction, culture over the 1000-1600 period and its present-day counterpart are stronger in the regions where it was more necessary to cope with consumption risk because of the high but never extreme climate volatility (Boranbay and Guerriero, 2013) .
On top of this evidence, I elect as instrument for Culture the average standard deviation of the spring-summer temperature over the period 1000-1600 in Celsius, Temperature SD-M.
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The raw data are in grid format and collected from Guiot et al. (2010) . They cover most of Europe at a 5 degrees spatial resolution for all the years between 600 and 2000. 14 The observations are derived from several indirect proxies such as tree-rings, ice cores, pollens, and historical written records and, to the best of my knowledge, they constitute the only record of the European climate before 1500 at the grid level. If grid i belongs to multiple climatic cells, I assign this grid a figure equal to the average of the values Medieval climate volatility assumes in each represented cell weighted by the cell's relative contribution to grid i's area. Since the conditioning set X i,c gathers present-day human capital, financial development, sectoral specialization, religious beliefs, and climate volatility, it is very unlikely that the climate volatility of more than four centuries ago affects present-day differences in regional performances through a channel other than a culture of cooperation.
Turning to political institutions, Boranbay and Guerriero (2013) show that, consistent with their model, between 1000 and 1600 reforms towards tighter constraints on the elite's power were mostly driven by the factors boosting the investment surplus. In particular, they apply the argument put forward by Fleck and Hanssen (2006) and use as a proxy for investment surplus the difficulty-to-observe investments in farming technologies and longdistance trades. Starting from the former, the main determinant of the observability of farming activities is the terrain ruggedness in Km, Ruggedness. These data are retrieved directly from the G-Econ data set, which is in grid format and covers most of the world surface at the same spatial resolution of the cross-section used in the present study, i.e., 1 degree. For what concerns long-distance trades, a natural proxy for their observability 13 Medieval climate volatility squared is not significantly related to culture (Boranbay and Guerriero, 2013) . 14 I exclude the Canarias, and part of Castilla y León, Galicia, Northern and Western Ireland, Scotland, and Portugal (Andorra, Gibraltar, Luxembourg, Malta, and San Marino) since the relative raw data are unavailable (to have sufficient within-country geographic variation). This strategy has no material impact on the estimates. Finally, I do not consider some of the cells available from Guiot et al. (2010) since I lack sufficient data on the historical political entities to which they belonged in the Middle Ages.
would be the grid's distance from the major Medieval harbours. In the following, I discuss the results generated by employing a dummy equal to 1 if the grid has a direct access to the Mediterranean or the Atlantic Ocean, Coast. Yet, the estimates will be quite similar should I switch to the variable Trade, which equals: 1. the average of the sea distances between the major grid's harbour-i.e., that with the highest average population between 1000 and 1600 according to Bairoch, Batou, and Chèver (1988) -and respectively Istanbul and Alexandria if the grid has a direct access to the Mediterranean; 2. the average of the sea distances between the major grid's harbour and respectively Cape Town and Havana if the grid has a direct access to the Atlantic Ocean; 3. 0 if the grid has no direct access to the coast. Since for grids with a direct access to the coast Trade increases in the distance from the major hubs channelling long-distance Medieval trades (Brady, Oberman, and Tracy, 1994) , it gauges better than Coast the difficulty to observe the investments that determined Democracy.
The relative coefficients however are more difficult to interpret. Building on an argument similar to that unravelled before, conditional on present-day climate volatility, distance to the coast, and main shifters of transportation costs, like specialization patterns, Ruggedness or Coast should have no impact on Income through channels other than Democracy.
A comparison between the two top (bottom) maps of figure 2 and the central (rightmost) map of figure 3 plus the estimates listed in table 3 confirm that the evidence on culture (inclusive political institutions) discussed by Boranbay and Guerriero (2013) remains true in my sample. Both past institutions and their geographic determinants are powerful drivers of present-day institutions. 15 Crucially, not only all the coefficients reflect the theoretical predictions, but geography enters the first stages in a nice separable way whereby the factor modulating the need of risk-sharing shapes mostly present-day culture, whereas the forces determining the investment surplus drive mainly current political institutions.
To assure that the exclusion restriction holds, I include in X i,c not only those determinants of development possibly related to culture and democracy, but also the most likely alternative channels through which the instruments could directly shape present-day outcomes.
First, a growing body of research prompts that institutions are affected by education, which also directly modulates economic growth (Tabellini, 2010; Gennaioli et al., 2013) 
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Second, a relevant concern is that more politically autonomous regions have received over time more transfer payments from the central government and this could bias upward the estimate of γ 0 (Tabellini, 2010). To account for this issue, I also include Capital, which is defined as the estimated 2000 real capital stock per capita, in millions of euro, at the NUTS 2 regional level (Derbyshire, Gardiner, and Waights, 2013) . Taking into account
Capital also assures that the estimate of β 0 is not picking up only the correlation between the climate-driven micro-credit activities that spread in the 15th and 16th centuries thanks to the Franciscans and present-day financial development (Muzzarelli, 2001 ).
Third, it is conceivable that Medieval climate variability has influenced the patterns of into account the average distance to the coast in Km in the grid again collected from the G-Econ data set, Distance-to-Coast. This proxy gauges the modern economic relevance of the sea as a means of exchange since, in Europe, terrestrial movements are free nowadays but were heavily regulated in the Middle Ages (Brady, Oberman, and Tracy, 1994 ).
The empirical results will be similar should I also consider the average over the 1980-2008 period of either the monthly temperature (precipitation) in Celsius (ml) or the standard deviation of the (maximum) monthly precipitation over the year in ml, the distance to either a navigable river or an ice-free ocean in km, and the area of the grid in square kilometres (see the internet appendix). These factors could affect Income by modulating the extent of ethnic diversity (Michalopoulos, 2012) . Finally, allowing clustering by country produces similar second stages but weakens the first stages because of the high within correlation among climate cells due to the data resolution (see the internet appendix). (2) is not statistically significant.
Culture Versus Political Institutions

Main Results
Robustness and Sensitivity Checks
The basic estimates suggest that culture has a first-order positive effect on income per capita, whereas the impact of more inclusive political institutions albeit positive is economically small and statistically insignificant. This is consistent with an expanding literature concluding that the average effect of democracy on performance is at most weak (see Persson and Tabellini, [2009] ). Next, I illustrate a number of robustness and sensitivity checks.
Controlling for Observables
Columns (3) to (8) of table 4 reveal that the proxy for culture is not picking up only differences in either human capital or financial development across regions, that the significant coefficient on Culture is not driven by the omission of either sectoral specialization or religious beliefs, and that the impact of past geography on present-day development is not capturing stickiness in climate volatility or the mere vicinity to the coast. 17 As expected, financial development seems to be a key mechanism through which culture fosters economic growth. Finally, while the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected at a level nowhere 17 The OLS counterparts of these specifications point in a similar direction (see the internet appendix).
lower than 15%, the Anderson canonical correlations test rejects that equation (1) 
Semi-Reduced-Forms
The validity of the exclusion restriction is confirmed by the semi-reduced-forms estimates (see table 5 ). Here, I address the potential concern that the geography relevant in the Middle Ages might be affecting the economy through channels other than institutions. This is quite worrisome in the light of the fierce debate in the development literature on whether the correlation between institutional and economic success is driven by unobservable geographic features (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013) . (6)).
Pairwise Analysis of Adjacent Grids
In spite of employing a rich conditioning set, one may still be worried that some unobservable feature, like some unconsidered but relevant geographic characteristic, is driving the results. To tackle this issue, I focus on contiguous grids with different Medieval cli-mate volatility to confirm the link between culture and development (see also Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, [2013] ). Even if this exercise cannot be tailored to contrast culture and democracy, it is naturally fitted to confirm the casual impact of culture on economic success.
Operationally, I first identify contiguous grids falling in the same country whose difference in Temperature SD-M is at least 0.01 Celsius. 
where Y i(j),c is Income in grid i of country c that is adjacent to grid j in the same country c with grid i and j differing in their Temperature SD-M values. Since I am now including country-specific, grid-pair fixed effects-α i(j),c , the coefficient on a culture of cooperation, β 0 , captures whether differences in Medieval climate volatility translate into differences in the natural logarithm of GDP per capita within pairs of contiguous grids in the same country conditional on the rich set of observables contained in X i,c and grid-pair specific, timeinvariant features like persistent beliefs, unobserved geography, and local inputs. Table 6 reports the results of the contiguous-grid analysis. Starting from the first stages, the key observations are that Temperature SD-M is always a strong predictor of Culture and that none of the observables in X i,c is strongly correlated with Culture within pairs of contiguous grids. These patterns imply that, by focusing on neighboring grids, I neutralize the role of local observables that were instead relevant in tables 4 and 5 (estimates available upon request). Turning to the second stages, columns (1) to (7) show that within country, within pairs of contiguous grids, Income is significantly higher in the grids that display stronger norms of trust and respect today because they experienced a more erratic climate during the Middle Ages. A one-standard deviation rise in present-day culture-i.e., 0.52-will lead to a 6% increase in present-day GDP per capita and the estimated β 0 is significant at 10% or better. This time, the estimates suggest that both human and real capital are significant channels through which culture shapes the economy. Finally, the Anderson canonical correlations test rejects that equation (3) is underidentified at a level nowhere higher than 1%
and, once Coast is used as second excluded instrument, I cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions at the usual significance level (results available upon request).
Inside the Black Box
The evidence so far establishes that a culture of cooperation has a first order effect on long-run economic development, whereas the inclusiveness of political institutions does not play a relevant role. What could be the micro-mechanisms justifying this pattern? While an exhaustive answer to this question is beyond the scope of the present paper, in this section I exploit data on the misbehaviors of the members of the House of Representatives of the Italian Parliament gathered by Chang, Golden, and Hill (2010) to substantiate the idea that culture but not democracy is necessary to produce public-spirited politicians and push voters to punish political malfeasance. Ideally, this test would need data on the misbehaviors of the incumbents of the regional elections of all the NUTS 2 units in the sample. Yet, it is extremely hard to identify comparable measures of misbehaviors across regions. Focusing instead on the incumbents of Italian national elections has several major advantages. First, as illustrated below, it is available an extremely homogeneous and precise measure of political malfeasance. Second, more inclusive regional institutions should strengthen the voters'
incentives to monitor all their representatives and not only the regional ones. Third, autonomous regions are typically run by region-specific parties, which usually obtain also the majority of the preferences in the region at national elections. For instance, since its founda- 22 By definition, a RAP is an allegation of malfeasance, rather than a conviction, and as such it could also capture judicial zeal and prejudice. Yet, members of Parliament could receive a RAP from any Italian tribunal and at the province level there exists a strong correlation between RAP and a measure of corruption based on the extent of missing infrastructures in public works in the 1990s (Chang, Golden, and Hill, 2010) . Nannicini et al. (2013) propose a model implying that a larger fraction of civic voters discourages moral hazard by politicians. Moreover, a stronger culture of cooperation produces representatives who are less opportunistic and more likely to internalize social welfare.
Finally, immoral politicians might self select in low culture districts in search of a lenient electorate. A more inclusive political process, instead, can produce more information on the behaviors of politicians but is irrelevant if voters are not morally compelled to punish 21 Focusing on the excluded instruments, the standard deviations of Temperature SD-M, Ruggedness, and Coast within the Northern (Southern) regions are respectively 0.04 (0.08), 0.11 (0.09), and 0.50 (0.41). 22 Following the scandals that destroyed the major political parties, the XI legislative term opened the so-called Second Republic. Nannicini et al. (2013) also present two measures of political misbehaviors for this period, i.e., the absenteeism rate and the politician's propensity to propose laws targeted to local constituencies. I do not consider these proxies since the two conducts are much less disruptive and publicized than RAPs.
political malfeasance or if politicians have weak civic virtues (Boix and Posner, 1998) .
I expect that a stronger culture of cooperation should be significantly associated with lower values of RAP and Serious-RAP, whereas Democracy should not. Figures 2, 3 , and 4 confirm this idea whereby representatives elected in districts where culture is weaker are more likely to receive both types of criminal prosecutions, and those elected in autonomous regions do not seem to be more virtuous than an average Italian politician (see figure 4 ).
Empirical Strategy and Main Results
Turning to multivariate analysis, I add to the basic specification proposed by Nannicini et al. (2013) the variable Democracy running as a result second stage regressions of the type
where M p,j,t is either RAP or Serious-RAP for politician p in the electoral district j during the legislature t. 23 The excluded instruments for C j and D j are again Temperature SD-M, Ruggedness, and Coast. While the legislature fixed effects κ t account for aggregate legislative term shocks, the vector Z p,j,t gathers individual characteristics like education, age, and previous government experience. Finally, V j pools both district-specific variables, as per-capita income and urbanization, and the other controls discussed above (see table 7 ).
To match data measured at the NUTS 2 unit (grid) level to districts, I construct district averages weighted by the unit's (grid's) relative contribution to the district's area.
Panel A of table 7 reports the estimates when the dependent variable is RAP, whereas panel B of table 7 lists the estimated coefficients when the dependent variable is Serious-RAP. The estimates reveal that the incidence of both general and serious RAP is significantly lower in districts in which internalized norms of respect and trust are stronger but not in districts historically characterized by more inclusive political institutions. According to column (2) , an increase in Culture equal to its standard deviation-i.e., 0.63-would reduce the incidence of receiving a RAP by about 4.6 percent and that of receiving a RAP for serious crimes by about 2.7 percent. Moving from the lowest level of culture-recorded in the Sicil-23 Switching to an instrumental variables probit estimator is not feasible since the routine maximizing the relative likelihood function often fails to converge. Including in equation (4) regional dummies as in Nannicini et al. (2013) would make the first stages weak by taking away much of the variation in Temperature SD-M.
ian districts-to the highest level of culture-recorded in Valle d'Aosta-would reduce the expected value of RAP by almost 23 percent, and that of Serious-RAP by almost 14 percent. 24 Once again, the consistency of the estimates is confirmed by the underidentification test, the Sargan statistics, and the semi-reduced forms estimates (available upon request).
I interpret this evidence as supporting the notion that my measure of culture and the sources of variation I exploit are related to the willingness of voters to punish their political representatives and the politicians' morality. Since political accountability constitutes the key instrument through which society can curb the risk of expropriation by politically powerful elites and assure that taxation is transformed in public goods, this mechanism constitutes a crucial channel through which a culture of cooperation shapes economic activities.
Concluding Comments
Overwhelming evidence suggests that a culture of cooperation and inclusive political witnessing a harsher electoral punishment of the incumbent's misbehavior (Nannicini et al., 2013) . The role of culture in strengthening political accountability points to a key channel through which it also shapes contract enforcement and property rights protection. This is only one possible mechanism inducing the primacy of culture, and more work is needed to characterize the different conduits through which institutions affect the economy. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 3.
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All specifications include a constant term. The control variables used in the second stage are also included in the first stage. 4.
In columns (2) to (8), the endogenous variables are Culture and Democracy and the excluded instruments are Temperature SD-M, Ruggedness, and Coast.
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The null hypothesis of the Anderson canonical correlations-underidentification-test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous variables. 6.
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is that the excluded instruments are exogenous as a group. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 3.
All specifications include a constant term; in addition, those in columns (2) to (7) incorporate respectively Tertiary-Education, Capital, AF Employment, Catholicism, Temperature SD and Temperature Max, and Distance-to-Coast. The control variables used in the second stage are also included in the first stage. 4.
In panel A (B), the endogenous variable is Culture and the excluded instruments are (instrument is) Temperature SD-M and Coast (Temperature SD-M ). In panel C (D), the endogenous variable is Democracy and the excluded instruments are (instrument is) Ruggedness and Coast (Ruggedness).
The null hypothesis of the Anderson canonical correlations-underidentification-test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous variable. 6.
All specifications include a constant term.
4.
The null hypothesis of the Anderson canonical correlations-underidentification-test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous variables. The range of each variable is divided into five intervals using the goodness of variance fit method. 
